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I

t has often been said in this Conference that the enforcement of existing law is
essential; and criminal law is referred to as an essential means of enforcement.
But a report dealing with enforcement through criminal law must question this
basic assumption. There are reasons to believe that the actual role of criminal law
in the enforcement of international humanitarian law is rather limited,1 and not
as important as many seem to think.
One of the purposes of criminal law is to serve as a deterrent against prohibited
acts. 2 But this deterrent effect presupposes that there must be a reasonable
probability for the perpetrator of a crime that he or she is indeed prosecuted and
punished. 3 But taking into account the fact that since the aftermath of the Second
World War, many war crimes have been committed but very few have been
prosecuted,4 this requirement is hardly met. There are a number of factors
inhibiting such prosecution and punishment. During the conflict, the party to
which the perpetrator belongs is quite often unwilling to offend the military by
prosecuting soldiers fighting for their country. The other party, if it happens to
apprehend a perpetrator, quite often fears reprisals against its own prisoners. Third
parties, which are also under an obligation to prosecute and punish grave breaches
against the Geneva Conventions, often lack the political will to do so. It must be
mentioned, however, that the only defendant physically present before the
International Tribunal for former-Yugoslavia was arrested in Germany in order
to be prosecuted by German authorities for grave breaches of the Geneva
Convention.5 But looking at State practice as a whole, this is rather an exception.
After the conflict, there has often been a tendency to discontinue any trials of
crimes committed during past conflicts. This has until recently even been true in
many countries as far as war crimes committed during the Second World War are
concerned.6
There is an additional factor reducing the deterrent effect of criminal law for
crimes committed in an armed conflict. The typical war criminal is not like the
clandestine thief who knows very well that he acts outside the value system of his
or her society. As in many cases of peacetime torture, the war criminal thinks of
himself as being part of this value system, as doing his duty for his country? This
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perception mayor may not be true in a particular country, but it is nevertheless a
reality which reduces the deterrent effect of criminal law provisions.
Whether the recent establishment of two international tribunals for the
prosecution and punishment of violations of international humanitarian law is the
beginning of a new era where the punishment of those violations becomes a reality
likely to serve as a deterrent, remains to be seen. 8 The one defendant so far
physically present before such a tribunal is not sufficient for this purpose.
There is, however, a very basic phenomenon, the significance of which cannot
be denied: criminal law reflects and shapes basic value decisions ofa given society.9
This fact accounts for the importance of the grave breach provisions of the Geneva
Conventions. It is also true for national criminal law. For this reason, changes in
value perception ofsocieties are often reflected in changes ofcriminal law. Changes
in the criminalization of sexual practices and of abortion are well-known
examples. lO So is the protection of the environment. The tremendous
development of environmental legislation which took place in many States, in
particular the Western industrialized States in the seventies, was accompanied by
the adoption of criminal law provisions designed to sanction offenses against the
environment. ll But this cultural or educational effect of criminal law presupposes
clarity of the law. Reinterpretation is not enough for this purpose.
We have now to ask whether and to what extent criminal law, national or
international, adequately protects environmental concerns of our global
community also in times of armed conflict. In the two decades since the
resumption of international negotiations to confirm and develop the law
applicable in times of armed conflict in the early seventies, there has been a
growing trend to reflect the international concern for the preservation of the
world's environment also in norms of international humanitarian law. 12 Whether
and to what extent this trend should lead to a further development is one of the
questions discussed at this Conference. How far has criminal law followed these
trends, or does it lag behind? An answer to this question, of course, presupposes
an analysis of existing law relating to the conduct of armed conflict.
Here, we have to distinguish two different kinds of norms. First, there are
norms which provide for an obligation of States to prosecute and punish certain
violations of the laws of war. These are not criminal law provisions stricto sensu as
they require some kind of national implementation legislation in order to become
effective. The provisions of the Geneva Conventions on grave breaches are of that
character. They require States to apply their national criminal law to the effect
that these breaches are indeed prosecuted and punished, it being left to the national
law of each State party whether or to what extent this can be done under existing
law or whether specific implementation legislation is necessary.13 There are a great
variety of legal techniques adopted by States in order to fulflll this obligation,
including an action based on the assumption (which mayor may not be correct)
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that existing national criminal law is sufficient to allow the punishment ofall kinds
of grave breaches.14
The second type of norm is an international criminal law provision stricto sensu,
i.e., an international norm providing directly for the punishment of the guilty
individual without the necessity ofany additional national act. 1S The international
crime of aggression is the best known example of this kind of a norm. The grave
breach provisions of the Geneva Conventions may also acquire a similar quality
where they are referred to in an additional international document giving a specific
judicial body the power to apply those provisions as a basis for prosecution and
punishment of offenders. This is the case for the statutes of the tribunals
established for the punishment of violations of international humanitarian law in
former-Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 16 It will also be the case if an international
criminal court is established on the basis of a treaty along the lines proposed by
the International Law Commission. 17
Let us, therefore, first analyse the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva
Conventions and Protocol I Additional thereto. The definition of grave breaches
contained in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions 18 (Articles 50, 51, 130, 147
respectively) and Additional Protocol 119 (Article 85(3) and (4)) is characterized
by the fact that it mainly protects persons as victims. The new provisions of
Additional Protocol I which expressly protect the environment in times of armed
conflict are not in the list of grave breaches of that Protocol. The only provision
protecting mainly objects is Article 85(4)(b) concerning historic monuments.
There is, however, one element in the definition of the Geneva Conventions which
does not refer to persons, but to objects and which is certainly relevant for the
protection of the environment: "extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly". The Statute of the International Tribunal for the former-Yugoslavia
expressly paraphrases this element of the definition.20
The question has thus to be asked whether and to what extent this kind of grave
breach applies to the environment. The destruction of oil-wells in Kuwait may
serve as an example for the problem. There is no doubt that this destruction
constituted an "extensive destruction not justified by military necessity and
carried out unlawfully and wantonly" as there was apparently no military purpose
behind it.21 But the environmental damage lies elsewhere, not in the destruction
of the oil-wells. The environmental effect consists in the air pollution and the
particles which go down on the desert or on mountains far away. To the extent
that the destruction of oil installations resulted in pollution of sea areas and
beaches, the same holds true: the environmental damage is not the same as the
actual destruction of property. One can then argue that the elements of the
environment which are damaged as a consequence of the destruction are also
property within the meaning of that provision. This may be so if land owned by

476

Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict

somebody is damaged. But where the marine environment or certain species living
on land are the victim, it is at least not a matter of course to conclude that this
damage to the environment also constitutes a destruction of property. It is thus
more than doubtful whether the existing grave breaches provisions of the Geneva
Conventions adequately cover illegal causation of environmental damage in times
of armed conflict.
Assuming that the environmental damage caused by the destruction of the oil
wells constituted, within the meaning of Article 55 of Additional Protocol I,
"widespread, long-term and severe damage" and also was likely "to prejudice the
health or survival of the population" (for instance because of their effect on
desalination plants), would this trigger a duty of States to prosecute and punish
this violation of the Protocol? The question is, in other words, whether there is a
duty to punish violations below the level of grave breaches. This can only be said
if one assumes that the general duty to ensure compliance with the applicable law
by all means necessary and appropriate necessarily includes criminal prosecution.
This is far from being certain, to say the least.
But even if there is no duty to punish offenses against the environment, is there
a right of States to apply their national law protecting the environment and to
prosecute and punish the offender on that basis? This, first, raises a sovereign
immunity problem, when the offender belongs to the other party. It is submitted,
however, that a public official cannot claim sovereign immunity for official acts
which are in violation of the laws of war, although the well recognized exception
to the rule of immunity for official acts only applies to war crimes. 22 The real
problem, however, is of a substantive character. National criminal law provisions
relating to the environment are just not made for this kind of an offense. Generally,
they are in one way or the other related to national administrative law. 23 Those
who are polluting the environment in contravention of national rules concerning
permissible pollution are punished. One could, of course, argue that a pollution
caused in violation of international law should also be considered a violation of
internal law and therefore punishable under the relevant national rules. But, to
say the least, defense attorneys would have a good case if this were pleaded by the
prosecution. A number of international conventions relating to the protection of
the environment in times of peace, however, require the States parties to take
specific national measures to implement those treaties, including criminal
prosecution of offenders.24 They are not relevant in this context, but it is in this
direction that the law relating to the protection of the environment in times of
armed conflict should develop.
The recent development of international criminal jurisdiction also raises the
problem, already mentioned, whether causing a serious damage to the
environment constitutes a genuine international crime as defmed in the report of
the International Law Commission concerning the creation of a permanent
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international criminal tribunal: "A norm of international law accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as being of such
a fundamental character that its violation gives rise to the criminal responsibility
of individuals." Article 19(3)(d) of the I.L.C. Draft Articles on International
ResponsibilitiS designates the serious breach of an international obligation of
essential importance for the preservation of the environment, such as those
prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the sea, as being an
"international crime." Whether this provision really envisages the creation of a
genuine criminal law provision is, however, far from being certain.26 This is
different for Article 26 of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security
of Mankind. 27 It would go too far, however, to consider either draft as already
constituting customary law.
In conclusion, one can say that national and international criminal law can and
must be used in order to sanction violations of the laws of war relating to the
protection of the environment. But the law in this respect is not as clear and
unequivocal as it could and should be and it does not necessarily cover all
violations which should be covered. Therefore, this law needs further
development.
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